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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

;

Plaintiff/Appellee,

]
])

v.
VICTOR VIALPANDO,

;
)
]

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20020405-CA

Priority No. 2.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2001), this Court has jurisdiction over
this case. Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for driving under the
influence of alcohol, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 416-44 (2000), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, the Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL & STANDARD OF APPELLATE
REVIEW
1. Did the trial court correctly determine that Trooper Plank had reasonable
suspicion to stop the defendant after Trooper Plank testified that he had
observed the defendant chasing a woman? This Court should review the
trial court's determination of reasonable suspicion for correctness, giving

1

limited weight to the trial court's application of the law to the facts:
"Whether a specific set of facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a
determination of law and is reviewable nondeferentially for
correctness... [with] a measure of discretion [afforded] to the trial judge
when applying that standard to a given set of facts." State v. Pena, 869
P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 1994); see also Salt Lake City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d
1003, 1006 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Did the trial court properly admit the intoxilyzer results into evidence after
finding that Trooper Plank observed the defendant for fifteen minutes prior
to administering the test? The standard of review for a trial court's factual
determination is clear error: "A trial court's factual findings will not be
reversed absent clear error." State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, \ 60,28 P.3d
1278, 1291 (Utah 2001) (citations omitted).
Did the trial court properly give a jury instruction containing language
taken from cases decided by this Court concerning actual physical control
of a vehicle? The standard of review is correction-of-error: "[W]e review
the trial court's determination concerning jury instructions for correctness
and accord it no particular deference." State v. Jones, 878 P.2d 1175, 1176
(Utah Ct. App. 1994).
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2)
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol, in
violation of I I C \ § 14 6 : 1 4 forfaeitig ii i acti n il pi i} sical coi ltrol of a v el licle
while intoxicated on July 2, 2000. Before trial, defendant filed a motion to
suppress evidence, alleging that Trooper Plank illegally seized him. Defendant
also moved to suppress the result (* • ; reath test, arguing t
I n n eliable Oi i December 1, 20* M >, the ti ial coi irt denied this motion without a
hearing. The defendant filed a motion to reconsider. On March 12, 2001, Judge
Walter Ellett heard testimony from the arresting trooper and argument from the
(ItieiiUaiit

Ilniil, h a d iiMsoimbk 1 s u s p i c i o n (n slop

Jitttj.ii' 1 liill f 4 II 11 II i liiiii! I n

the defendant and that the test result was admissible. A jury trial was held on
April 24, 2002 in front of Judge Pat B. Brian. The jury convicted the defendant of
driving or being in actual physical control of a \ chicle \ v 1 rile n u idei 1:1 le infh ience of
' ":

alcohol.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On July 2, 2000, Trooper Plank of the Utah Highway Patrol was on patrol
in the early i iioi ning hoi irs f! 61

^ i oi it l i 1:00 a i n , * 1 lile ti a\ eling up 3200

West and approaching the South Frontage Road, from a distance of approximately
fifty yards, Trooper Plank noticed a woman being chased across the street by a
man

I" M

I lit* nuiii v\ii,. Lfti'if itlailiTiod ;is ddciinl, nl \' ilp.nnlo

I'! 61

limopei

Plank testified that the man and woman were yelling and appeared to be in an
altercation. R.61.
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Trooper Plank was alarmed by the situation and wanted to make sure that
the woman was safe. R.62. Trooper Plank activated his overhead lights to stop
the defendant from chasing the woman and turned his vehicle around at the first
opportunity. R. 61. Trooper Plank observed the defendant cross the street again,
then enter a car. R.62. Trooper Plank pulled his vehicle directly behind the
defendant. R.62. Trooper Plank approached the defendant and asked why he had
been chasing the woman. R. 62. The defendant explained that the woman was his
girlfriend and that they had been fighting. R. 63. Trooper Plank observed that the
defendant was in the driver's seat (R.68); the vehicle's headlights were on (Trial
Tr., p.33-34); the keys were in the ignition (Trial Tr., p.33); and the defendant had
his seatbelt on (Trial Tr., p.33). Upon talking with the defendant, Trooper Plank
noticed that his eyes were red, his speech was slurred, and that there was a strong
odor of alcohol emanating from his body. R.63.
Based on these observations, Trooper Plank asked the defendant to perform
certain field sobriety tests. R. 63. Trooper Plank administered the horizontal gaze
nystagmus, the nine-step walk and turn, and the one-leg stand. R.63. The
defendant exhibited indications of intoxication on each test. R.63-64. Trooper
Plank proceeded to arrest the defendant and requested that the defendant submit to
a breath test. R.65. Trooper Plank made this request at approximately 1:37 a.m.
and the defendant agreed to be tested. R.65.
Trooper Plank decided to transport the defendant to the Sorensen Center to
administer the breath test. R.65. Trooper Plank estimated that the Sorenson
4

Center, located at 900 West and approximately 1300 West, was twenty-three or
twenty-four blocks away from the site of the arrest. R 6^

in

"!nnk

liiiiidi'iiffcd thr ii!Hrn<biii [iini plan nil him in ihr 1'ionl MM! IKY a use his vehicle was
not equipped with a cage. R.70. While traveling to the center, the defendant
indicated that he felt the need to vomit R 65-66. Trooper Plank pulled over and
the defendant vomited outside of tl :te \ ehicle R 65-66 A ftei 1:1 le defei idai it
i eti irned to vehicle, I rooper Plank checked the defendant's mouth to ensure that it
was clear. R.70. After checking, Trooper Plank began the fifteen-minute
observation period <i

-

. i -.. n the car with the defendai

!, I pon 11; ai"

i P! a n Is .'on 1 11 i tcA the observation period

while performing the necessary paperwork. R.72. During this time, the defendant
sat at the end of Trooper Plank's desk facing the officer. R 72 \ t 1:58 a.iii , the
Iiiloxil\ci >(>()() maUiim 1 bcj'aii to inn diiloiiihuti't internal i alibialioir

R 202

\t

2:00 a.m., the defendant blew into the intoxilyzer. R.202. Ihe test result indicated
a 175 breath alcohol level. R.202.
Defendant was charged with driving or
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of U.C.A. § 41-6-44(2).
R.l. On November 1, 2000, the defendant submitted a motion to suppress
evidence claiming that he had been illegally seized ai id that the bi eath test i e si lit
was imreliable

)ecember 4, 2000, the trial court denied the

defendant's motion without a hearing. R.29. The defendant asked the trial court to
reconsider the motion. R.30. I lie trial court granted this request, R 4(J" I lit

March 12, 2001, Judge Walter Ellett heard arguments from the defendant asserting
that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him and that the trooper
did not satisfy the fifteen-minute observation period requirement before
administering the breath test. R.60-78. Judge Ellett denied the defendant's
motion, finding that Trooper Plank had articulated facts sufficient to support his
reasonable suspicion that a crime either had been or was about to be committed,
and that the Trooper had observed the defendant for fifteen minutes prior to
administering the breath test. R. 107.
A jury trial was held on April 24, 2002 in front of Judge Pat B. Brian.
When the defendant finished his case, instructions were given to the jury. Trial
Tr. 69. Defense counsel objected on the record to jury instruction number eight
concerning actual physical control. Trial Tr. 81-82. Judge Brian noted and
overruled the defendant's objection. Trial Tr. 81-82. The jury subsequently
returned a guilty verdict to the defendant of driving or being in actual physical
control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. R. 186.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

The trial court properly concluded that Trooper Plank had reasonable

suspicion to initiate the stop of the defendant based on the fact that Trooper Plank
viewed a woman running away from the defendant very early in the morning
across a highway. This suspicion authorized Trooper Plank to investigate any
possibility of criminal activity.
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2.

The trial court properly admitted the intoxilyzer test results based on its

findings that Trooper Plank observed the defendant for fifteen minutes before
administering the test. Furthermore, Trooper Plank was reasonably likely to detect
any action by the defendant that would compromise the results of the breath test
when the defendant was positioned near him in the front seat of his vehicle for a
portion of the fifteen-minute observation period.
3.

The trial court gave an appropriate jury instruction on actual physical

control. The instruction reflected the relevant, controlling law that this Court has
announced concerning actual physical control of a vehicle under the driving under
the influence statute.
ARGUMENT
I.

TROOPER PLANK'S STOP OF THE DEFENDANT WAS
SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION BASED ON
HIS OBSERVATION OF THE DEFENDANT CHASING A
WOMAN ACROSS A STREET
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in concluding that

Trooper Plank had reasonable suspicion to stop and seize him. Br. Aplt. 9
Specifically, defendant argues that at the moment Trooper Plank actually
approached, the woman was not in the vicinity, therefore Trooper Plank did
not have a legal basis to proceed with the stop because any concern for the
woman's safety had dissipated. Br. Aplt. 12.

7

A.

The trial court properly concluded that Trooper Plank
legally stopped the defendant.

Defendant moved the trial court to suppress all evidence stemming from
Trooper Plank's seizure of him. R. 15. After hearing testimony from Trooper
Plank, the trial court found that the trooper had sufficiently articulated facts that
supported his suspicion that a crime had been or was about to be committed. R.
77. The Utah Code provides that a police officer may stop an individual when the
officer has reasonable suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal
conduct.1 Under this statute, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that a "brief
investigatory stop of an individual by police officers is permissible when the
officers 'have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual
is involved in criminal activity.'" State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah
1986) (quoting State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718, 719 (Utah 1985)).
This Court has stated that suspects need not be engaged in criminal activity
at the time of the stop to make a seizure lawful: "[T]he conduct observed and/or
information relied upon need not be illegal or describe illegal activity in order to
give a law enforcement officer reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, so long
as the officer can articulate facts which form the basis for his or her suspicion."
State v. Nyugen, 878 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting State v.

1

U.C.A. § 11-1 AS provides "A peace officer may stop any person in a public
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the
act of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his
name, address and an explanation of his actions."
8

Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah Ct. App.1990)). There is no "bright line
delineating what is or is not reasonable." State v. Holmes, 11A P.2d 506, 508
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. App.
1988)). Finally, to determine whether a stop is reasonable, the totality of the
circumstances must be considered: "Whether there are objective facts to justify
such a stop depends on the 'totality of the circumstances."' State v. Mendoza, 748
P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 977 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).
In this case, Trooper Plank had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant
based on the totality of the circumstances. This Court should consider the
following facts: a woman was being chased by a man (R.62); at approximately 1
a.m. (R.61); the woman ran across a public street in an apparent attempt to escape
from the defendant (R.62); and, it appeared that the two were in some type of
altercation because the trooper heard yelling (R.62). Based on these objective
facts, it is reasonable to suspect that a host of different crimes, such as assault or
robbery, could have been or were about to be committed.
The fact that the defendant's activity was not criminal on its face does not
render Trooper Plank's stop unlawful. The law only requires that Trooper Plank
identify the facts that gave rise to the suspicion. State v. Nyugen, 878 P.2d 1183,
1186 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In this case, Trooper Plank indicated at the pretrial
hearing that chasing and yelling lead him to believe that some type of criminal
offense had or was about to occur. R.62. After hearing these facts, the trial court
9

concluded that "the fact that [Trooper Plank] saw what he saw and has articulated
it sufficient for me to believe that he thought that a crime had either been
committed or was about to commit, gives him a basis to turn around, stop and
inquire." R.77.
Defendant has argued that any concern for the woman's safety was
dissipated when the trooper approached because the woman was no longer in the
vicinity. Under this standard, an officer's reasonable suspicion would abruptly
vanish when criminal activity is paused or interrupted. The correct legal standard,
as contained in the Utah Code cited above, states that once an officer has observed
activity reasonably giving rise to a suspicion of criminal behavior, the officer may
stop and briefly detain an individual. There is no requirement that the activity
continue up to the very moment that the officer approaches, or that the officer turn
away if the activity halts. Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (2002).
In summary, Trooper Plank had reasonable suspicion that some type of
criminal activity had or was about to occur. A woman running across a street
away from a man, can indicate a number of different crimes, including assault,
sexual assault, robbery, kidnapping, or a domestic violence situation. Trooper
Plank was able to articulate the facts supporting his suspicion to the satisfaction of
the trial court, and the decision to deny defendant's motion to suppress should be
affirmed.

10

II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE
INTOXILYZER TEST RESULTS
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in

admitting the intoxilyzer test results. Br. Aplt. 13. Defendant contends that
it is questionable whether Trooper Plank began the observation period
fifteen minutes prior to administering the breath test. Br. Aplt. 20.
Defendant also argues that even if there was a fifteen minute period, the
trooper's observation during that time period was insufficient to render the
test result reliable. Br. Aplt. 20.

A.

The trial court properly admitted the test results upon finding that
Trooper Plank observed the defendant for fifteen minutes.
Defendant moved the trial court to exclude the intoxilyzer results as

unreliable because the defendant vomited prior to taking the test. (R. 15).
Defendant asserted that Trooper Plank did not observe him for fifteen minutes
after he vomited. (R. 15-16).
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3(l)(2002)2, the Department of
Public Safety has established that intoxilyzer results are admissible if the officer
observes the test subject for fifteen minutes prior to administering the test to
ensure that no substance is in the person's mouth. The Drinking Driver, Basic
Intoxilyzer Manual 118 (Utah Highway Patrol 1998); also see Salt Lake City v.

2

U.C.A. § 41-6-44.3(1) provides "The commissioner of the Department of Public
Safety shall establish standards for the administration and interpretation of
chemical analysis of a person's breath, including standards of training."
11

Womack, 747 P.2d 1039, 1041 (Utah 1987) (quoting State v. Baker, 56 Wash.2d
846, 355 P.2d 806, 811 (I960)). If this standard is met, "there is a presumption
that the test results are valid and further foundation for introduction of the
evidence is unnecessary." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3(3)(2002).
In this case, the trial court did not clearly err by admitting into evidence the
intoxilyzer results because the fifteen-minute observation requirement was met.
Trooper Plank testified that he began the observation period at 1:45 a.m. and that
the defendant took the test at 2:00 a.m. R. 70-71. Based on this testimony, Judge
Ellett found that Trooper Plank "did observe this defendant for a period of 15
minutes prior to the test being given." R.77. After making this finding, the trial
court correctly ruled that the test result was admissible: when the standards
promulgated by the Department of Public Safely are met, there is a presumption
that the test result is valid. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3(2002).
Defendant argues that Trooper Plank did not observe him for fifteen
minutes, and contends that his testing began at 1:58 a.m. Defendant points to the
intoxilyzer result and states that the initial testing began at 1:58 a.m.. Br. Aplt. 19.
The testing that began at 1:58, however, was of the machine itself, not the
defendant. From 1:58 until 2:00, the intoxilyzer went through internal calibrations
that automatically begin at the start of any test. R. 202. The defendant did not
actually put a breath sample into the intoxilyzer until 2:00 a.m.. R. 202.
Defendant asserts that it is questionable whether the observation period
truly began at 1:45 a.m.. Br. Aplt. 20. The time at which the observation period
12

began, however, is a factual determination that was decided at the pretrial hearing.
At that hearing, the State elicited testimony from Trooper Plank that he began the
observation period at 1:45 a.m. At that time, defense counsel was given full
opportunity to cross-examine Trooper Plank and discredit how he determined the
beginning point of the observation period. After hearing the testimony of the
trooper and arguments from counsel, Judge Ellett ruled "[i]ts my finding that
[Trooper Plank] did observe this defendant for a period of 15 minutes prior to the
test being given." While an appellate court is entrusted with ensuring legal
accuracy and uniformity, the appellate court should defer to the trial court on
factual matters. Brigham City v. Stuart, 2002 UT App 317 ^ 10, 57 P.3d 1111,
1113 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). This Court has noted that "[i]t is inappropriate for an
appellate court to disregard the trial court's findings of fact and to assume the role
of weighing evidence and making its own findings of f a c t . . . . The court of
appeals is limited to the findings of fact made by the trial court and may not find
new facts or reweigh the evidence." Ibid. This Court should decline defendant's
request to disturb the trial court's findings.
B.

Trooper Plank observed the defendant in a manner that was
reasonably likely to detect any actions that would have compromised
the test results.
Defendant also argues that Trooper Plank's surveillance during the

observation period was insufficient. Br. Aplt. 20. Defendant cites to a case
decided by the Idaho Court of Appeals for the proposition that "the level of
surveillance must be such as could reasonably be expected to accomplish the
13

purpose of the [observation] requirement." State v. Carson, 988 P.2d 225, 227
(Idaho Ct. App. 1999). The Carson court explained that an officer must watch the
suspect in "a mode of observation that would be likely to detect belching,
regurgitation into the mouth, or the like." Ibid, The defendant's assertion is
unpersuasive because Utah courts have not adopted the standard defendant
proposes. The authoritative law for this issue in Utah is the standard established
by the Utah Department of Public Safety. This standard requires a fifteen-minute
observation period and makes no indication that it is improper for an officer to
begin an observation period while in his cruiser. Based on this standard, Trooper
Plank's observations of the defendant in his cruiser are acceptable to begin the
fifteen-minute observation period.
Furthermore, even if the Carson standard is applicable, Trooper Plank was
reasonably likely to be able to sufficiently observe the defendant because the
defendant was in the front seat of his cruiser. In deciding the proper level of
surveillance, it should be noted that Idaho and a number of other jurisdictions do
not require an officer to "stare fixedly" at a suspect before testing. State v.
Remsburg, 882 P.2d 993, 995-96 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994). As a Connecticut court
stated:
In light of the regulation's purpose, we do not interpret [it] to require that
an officer fix his unswerving gaze upon a subject during each fifteen
minute interval prior to administration of a breath test. Such an
interpretation would not only be practically impossible to perform but
would allow a subject to thwart compliance with the regulation simply by
turning his head away from the observing officer.

14

State v. Smith, 547 A.2d 69, 73 (Conn. Ct. App. 1988); also see Gilbreath v.
Municipality of Anchorage, 713 P.2d 218 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); Goode v. State,
303 Ark. 609, 798 S.W.2d 430 (1990); Tipton v. Com., 770 S.W.2d 239 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1989); State v. Taylor, 781 S.W.2d 551 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Simpson v.
State, 707 P.2d 43 (Okl. Ct. App. 1985); State v. St. Jean, 554 A.2d 206 (R.I.
1989).
In Carson, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated "[although the observation
requirement does not mandate that an officer 'stare fixedly' at a test subject for the
full fifteen-minute period, the level of surveillance must be such as could
reasonably be expected to accomplish the purpose of the requirement." Carson,
988 P.2d at 227 (citation omitted). In that case, part of the fifteen-minute
observation period occurred while Carson was in the back seat of the officer's
cruiser. Because the officer's visual and aural senses were compromised, the court
found that the prosecution had failed to establish the foundational requirements for
admittance of the breath test. Ibid.
The Carson court indicates that the following facts influenced its
determination that the officer could not have maintained a proper level of
surveillance. The officer's attention was devoted to driving. Ibid. The officer
placed Carson in the rear seat of his cruiser while transporting him to a testing
center. Ibid. The officer "observed Carson only intermittently through glances at
the rearview mirror." Ibid. The officer's ability "to use hearing as a substitute for
visual observation was impeded by noise from the automobile engine, tires on the
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road surface, rain and windshield wipers." Ibid, Finally, the officer's "powers of
aural observation were compromised by a hearing impairment." Ibid. Based on
these facts, the court determined that the officer could not have reasonably been
likely to detect belching, regurgitation, etc.. Ibid.
The case before this Court is distinguishable from Carson on nearly all of
these facts. Most importantly, Trooper Plank was not limited to intermittent
glances through the rearview mirror to observe the defendant. Rather, in this case,
the defendant was in the front seat of the cruiser with Trooper Plank. Trooper
Plank testified that the defendant was "right next" to him in the car. Trial Tr p.39.
In this position, Trooper Plank had constant peripheral observation of the
defendant even while watching the road. Furthermore, after the defendant
vomited the first time, Trooper Plank testified, "I was actually more attentive than
normally because I'm really worried about my upholstery in my car, so I am more
attentive at looking at him than—than the road probably." Trial Tr p.40. From this
position, it was reasonably likely that Trooper Plank would have noticed any
vomiting, belching, or regurgitation by the defendant. In fact, because of his
proximity to the defendant, it is perhaps even more likely that Trooper Plank could
have detected actions in the car than he would have in the police station.
Furthermore, this case is also distinguishable from Carson because Trooper
Plank did not have to substitute aural for visual observations as the defendant was
right next to him. In fact, Trooper Plank's aural sense complimented his visual
observations. In this case, there is no evidence that Trooper Plank is hearing
16

impaired. There is no evidence that it was raining on the evening in question,
eliminating any possibility of noise from the rain or the windshield wipers. Also,
Trooper Plank testified that dispatch was not overly distracting because "it's 2:00
a.m., so it's pretty dead." Trial Tr. p.39. Therefore, besides seeing the defendant
belch, regurgitate, etc., Trooper Plank also would have heard any of these actions.
In summary, Trooper Plank was reasonably likely to detect any action by
the defendant that would have compromised the test result. Therefore, the
trooper's level of surveillance was sufficient to satisfy the purpose of the
observation requirement.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT GAVE A PROPER JURY INSTRUCTION
CONCERNING ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury

as to the appropriate elements and proof required to demonstrate actual physical
control. Br. Aplt. 21. (capitalization and boldface omitted). Defendant claims
that the Utah Supreme Court has defined actual physical control to include an
element of intent to drive or operate the vehicle. Br. Aplt. 23. Defendant
also argues that this Court has developed an incorrect guideline on actual
physical control by erroneously looking to Utah Supreme Court cases
decided in the context of driver's license revocation hearings. Br. Aplt.
32-33.
A.

Instruction number eight was proper because it accurately states the
law regarding actual physical control.
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At trial, counsel for the defense objected to jury instruction number eight.
(Trial Tr. 81.). Instruction number eight reads as follows:
A person need not actually move, or attempt to move, a
vehicle in order to have actual physical control, the person only
needs to have the apparent ability to start and move the vehicle. R. 177.
The jury was also instructed in a separate instruction, instruction number five, that
the subjective intent of the defendant not to drive does not preclude a finding of
actual physical control. R. 173. Defense counsel did not object to this
instruction. (Trial Tr. 81-82). The propriety of instruction number five, therefore,
should not be reviewed by this Court. "[A] contemporaneous objection or some
form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial
court record before an appellate court will review such claims on appeal." State v.
Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141,1144 (Utah 1989)(quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d
546, 551 (Utah 1987)). The objection must give the trial court notice of the "very
error" complained of. Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., 912 P.2d 457, 460
(Utah Ct. App. 1996)(quoting Beehive Medical Elec, Inc. v. Square D Co., 669
P.2d 859, 860 (Utah (1983)).
The trial court's decision to give instruction number eight should
be reviewed for correctness. "Determining the propriety of the instructions
submitted to the jury presents a question of law, and we therefore review the trial
court's instructions under a correction of error standard." State v. Gonzales, 2002
UT App 25617, 56 P.3d 969, 971 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Ames v. Maas,
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846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). "Generally, when an instruction
correctly states the law and does not unfairly prejudice the defendant, there is no
error." Ibid. \ 16, at 973.
It was proper for the trial court to give instruction number eight to the jury
because the language in this instruction was taken directly from controlling
caselaw. In State v. Barnhart, this Court reviewed decisions of the Utah Supreme
and appellate courts dealing with actual physical control, and recognized several
established legal guidelines. 850 P.2d 473, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). That "a
person need not actually move, or attempt to move, a vehicle, but only needs to
have an apparent ability to start and move the vehicle in order to be in actual
physical control," is one such guideline set forth in Barnhart. Ibid, (citations
omitted).
Defendant, however, asserts that this Court has developed incorrect
guidelines concerning actual physical control by erroneously relying on cases
stemming from license revocation proceedings to the exclusion of the definition
provided in State v. Bugger, 483 P.2d 442 (Utah 1971)3. Based on this Court's
alleged mistake, defendant states that "the substantial burden of persuasion for
overturning prior precedent has been met in this case given that the standards
The Bugger court provided the following definition for actual physical control: The
word 'actual' has been defined as meaning 'existing in act or reality;***in action or
existence at the time being; present;***'The word 'physical' is defined as 'bodily,' and
'control' is defined as 'to exercise restraining or directing influence over; to dominate;
regulate; hence, to hold from actions; to curb.' The term in 'actual physical control' in its
ordinary sense means 'existing' or 'present bodily restraint, directing influence,
domination or regulation.' Ibid, at p.443.
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applied by the court of appeals in D.U.I, cases do not comport with the
requirements set forth in Bugger, a Utah Supreme Court decision." Br. Aplt. p.3334 fn.4. Defendant contends that Bugger stands for the proposition that a person
must have some level of intent to drive or operate the vehicle to be in actual
physical control.
Defendant, however, ignores the fact that the driving under the influence
statute does not, on its face, include intent to drive as a component of actual
physical control. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a) prohibits any individual who is
under the influence of alcohol from operating or being in actual physical control of
a vehicle. The statute states "[a] person may not operate or be in actual physical
control of a vehicle within this state if the person . . . . " This statute (hereinafter
the D.U.I. statute) can be violated either by an intoxicated person driving a
vehicle, or being in actual physical control of a vehicle. The statute does not
provide a mens rea for either action, and clearly does not state that actual physical
control must be accompanied by a specific intent to drive. Defendant is,
essentially, asking this Court to add an element to the plain language of the D.U.I,
statute. The Utah Supreme Court has "rejected similar attempts to engraft a
judicially created intent requirement upon the plain language of a criminal
statute." State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1358 (Utah 1993)(finding intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud not required under securities fraud statute).
Defendant himself does not attempt to rely on the D.U.I, statute for his
contention that actual physical control includes an "intent to drive" requirement.
20

Rather, defendant argues that the Utah Supreme Court's definition of actual
physical control in State v. Bugger requires some level of intent to drive or operate
the vehicle. Br. Aplt. p. 23. The Bugger decision itself, however, does not state
that "intent to drive" is required under actual physical control. Defendant claims
that this requirement can be derived from the definition of control given by the
Supreme Court because this definition requires affirmative action. Br. Aplt. p. 23.
The Bugger definition of actual physical control includes "'existing' or 'present
bodily restraint, directing influence, domination or regulation.'" Bugger, 483 P.2d
at 405. None of these terms can fairly be said to inherently require an intent to
drive a vehicle.
Finally, the cases that have been issued since Bugger have gone on to
clearly state that intent to drive is not a component of actual physical control.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated
[W]e find it unnecessary for the department to show actual intent under the
control provisions of the implied consent statute. Just as an intent to drive
is inferred from one's actual driving, so also may an intent to control a
vehicle be inferred from the performance of those acts which we have held
to constitute actual physical control.
Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651, 655 (Utah 1982). This Court applied the
Garcia standard in criminal cases, finding "a person need not actually move, or
attempt to move, a vehicle, but only needs to have an apparent ability to start and
move the vehicle in order to be in actual physical control" under the D.U.I, statute.
State v. Barnhart, 850 P.2d 473,478 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Garcia v.
Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651, 654-55 (Utah 1982)).
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The Utah Supreme Court stated that the relevant question for determining
actual physical control is not whether the person had intent to drive, but rather
whether they had the ability to drive: "as long as a person is physically able to
assert dominion by starting the car and driving away, he has substantially as much
control over the vehicle as he would if he were actually driving it." Lopez v.
Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778, 780-781 (Utah 1986) (quoting Adams v. State, 697
P.2d 622, 625 (Wyo. 1985)). Furthermore, this Court has not listed intent as a
relevant factor for determining if an individual is in actual physical control:
(1) whether defendant was asleep or awake when discovered; (2) the
position of the automobile; (3) whether the automobile's motor was
running; (4) whether defendant was positioned in the driver's seat of the
vehicle; (5) whether defendant was the vehicle's sole occupant; (6) whether
defendant had possession of the ignition key; (7) defendant's apparent
ability to start and move the vehicle; (8) how the car got to the where it was
found; and (9) whether defendant drove it there.
Richfield City v. Walker, 790 P.2d 87, 93 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
These cases represent the controlling law in Utah for determining if a
person is in actual physical control of a vehicle. The trial court gave jury
instructions that were consistent with these cases, and, therefore, issued the correct
instructions.4
Defendant essentially asserts that the cases decided by this Court
concerning actual physical control, the same cases relied upon for the challenged
4

Instruction five provides, "The subjective intent of the defendant not to operate a
vehicle does not prevent youfromfinding that the defendant was in actual physical
control." Instruction eight states, "A person need not actually move, or attempt to move,
a vehicle in order to have actual physical control, the person only needs to have the
apparent ability to start and move the vehicle."
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jury instruction, are wrong. Defendant contends that this Court was incorrect in
looking to cases decided in the context of license revocation hearings because the
burden of proof required in criminal cases is higher than that required in civil
cases. Defendant, however, has not cited any authority for the proposition that a
definition developed in the context of civil hearings cannot be used or relied on in
a criminal proceeding. Defendant also fails to provide any authority for the
proposition that the applicable burden of proof requires a change in the elements
of an offense. The burden of proof goes to the fact-finder's level of certainty,
while the elements define the offense. The substantive content of the instruction
does not need to be altered so long as the jury is instructed that they must find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant urges this Court to grant a new trial because of the trial court's
failure to instruct the jury that they were required to find that the defendant
intended to drive while in actual physical control of a vehicle. Defendant,
however, objected to only one instruction, and did not proffer an instruction
concerning intent. Furthermore, defendant's contention that actual physical
control includes an "intent to drive" component is not supported by the D.U.I,
statute or the caselaw defining actual physical control. The trial court acted
properly by giving an instruction in accordance with the current law, and should
therefore be affirmed.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly determined that Trooper Plank had reasonable
suspicion to detain defendant and ask him questions after hearing the trooper's
testimony that he observed the defendant chase a woman across a street an hour
after midnight.
The trial court properly admitted the breath test result because the court
found that the fifteen minute observation period requirement had been satisfied.
Moreover, while seated next to the hand-cuffed defendant, Trooper Plank's level
of surveillance was such that he would have been reasonably likely to detect any
action on the part of the defendant that would have compromised the test results.
Finally, the contested jury instruction concerning actual physical control
reflected the controlling case law on this subject as announced by this Court. The
trial court was therefore correct in giving this instruction to the jury.
Based on the arguments above, the State asks this Court to affirm the
defendant's conviction and deny his request for a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^

(lay of February, 2003.

DAVID E.YOCOM
District Attorney

Alicia H. Cook
Deputy District Attorney
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Utah Code Annotated
§ 41-6-44(2) Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination
of both or with a specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration.
A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle
within this state if the person:
(i)

has sufficient alcohol in his body that a chemical test given within
two hours of the alleged operation or physical control shows that the
person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or
greater; or

(ii)

is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person
incapable of safely operating a vehicle.
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Utah Code Annotated
§ 41-6-44.3 Standards for chemical breath analysis - Evidence
(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public Safety shall establish
standards for the administration and interpretation of chemical analysis of a
person's breath, including standards of training.
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person
was operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol or any drug or operating with a blood or breath alcohol
content statutorily prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records
of acts, conditions, or events to prove that the analysis was made and the
instrument used was accurate, according to standards established in
Subsection (1), are admissible if:
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular course of the
investigation at or about the time of the act, condition, or event; and
(b) the source of information from which made and the method and
circumstances of their preparation indicate their trustworthiness.
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under Subsection (1) and
the conditions of Subsection (2) have been met, there is a presumption that
the test results are valid and further foundation for introduction of the
evidence is unnecessary.
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Utah Code Annotated
§ 77-7-15 Authority of peace officer to stop and question suspect Grounds.
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of
committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand
his name, address and an explanation of his actions.

28

ADDENDUM B
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TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT

I think as we look at circumstances today we put on officers is a [sic]
terrible burden, particularly where it may require them to investigate
domestic violence. And I think anytime they see anything that could
indicate a domestic violence circumstance coming on, I think we obligate
them to check and see. If we don't, they subject themselves to some kind
of (inaudible) for not doing something. The fact that he saw what he saw
and has articulated it sufficient for me to believe that he thought that a
crime had either been committed or was about to commit, gives him a basis
to turn around, stop and inquire. So I think that test has been met. I think
he had a right to do that.
The question now comes to the circumstances on the DUI. I think
once he makes the stop, once he makes the (inaudible) aspect of it, and
determines that there is an odor of alcohol and the defendant has failed to
do the tests that are normally given, then of course that leads him to believe
that additional tests, including breath tests, should be given. Its [sic] my
finding that he did observe this defendant for a period of 15 minutes prior
to the test being given. I don't think that belching or burping is going to be
an expiration that was anticipated by State v. Baker. I think that's a
situation where it brings something into the mouth. I don't think that
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(inaudible) odor from the stomach would constitute something that could
not be, says it could not be determined (tape ends). R. 77.
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ADDENDUM C
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Portion of Trial Transcript Containing Objection to Instruction
Number Eight.

The Court: The record will reflect the court's in session out of the presence
of the jury. You may be seated. The Court has permitted counsel to make a
record on one jury instruction after the fact, noting that the Court ruled the
instruction was appropriate, and you may make whatever record you wish.
Ms. Romero: Thank you, Judge. My objection was to instruction number 8.
It reads as follows:
"A person need not actually move or attempt to move a vehicle in
order to have actual physical control. The person only needs to have the
apparent ability to start and move the vehicle."
I objected to that instruction because it comes directly from a case
involving an administrative hearing with respect to the suspension of an
individual's driver's license, clearly a much lower standard that [sic] we
deal with in the criminal system. And my objection to that essentially was
that we've seen throughout the caselaw involving actual physical control
the courts get confused and cite you civil cases for standards applicable in
criminal cases.
So I have a generalized objection to that instruction because it does
come from a driver's license revocation proceeding case generally, and I
also have an objection to the fact that I know it appears subsequently cited
33

in criminal cases, but again they're quoting directly from the civilproceeding opinions. So that's my objection. I don't think it's the
appropriate standard in a criminal case. Thank you.
The Court: The objection is noted. The court's in recess.
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